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INTERNATIONAL LAW OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION:
APPLICATION TO NON-STATE ACTORS
Imrana Iqbal*
ABSTRACT
International legal responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism by
non-state actors have been many but often inconsistent, inadequate,
and legally unsound. This Article argues in favor of resorting to
successfully-implemented methods of dealing with similar crimes.
International law has already expanded from its original statist
conceptions and scope to include individuals, such as in
international human rights norms and international humanitarian
laws. In the latter, in particular, the law has expanded in the context
of both international and non-international armed conflict. This
Article argues that the advancement of law in these areas can lend
much to efforts to bring nuclear terrorism within the scope of
International Criminal Court, from whose jurisdiction this crime is
currently excluded. This Article also recommends purposefully
elevating the prohibition against possession and use of nuclear
weapons by non-state actors to jus cogens, making such acts
international crimes of the type that do not necessarily require state
consent for prosecution by an international tribunal.

*Imrana Iqbal is an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland
University College (UMUC). She teaches writing, government, law, and business.
I am grateful to Professor Paul F. Diehl, Ashbel Smith Professor of Political
Science at the University of Texas at Dallas, for his review of this work and
valuable suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION

The concern that terrorists may acquire and use nuclear
weapons predates the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States.1 The disquiet that terrorists’ activities are growing deadlier
with time and may culminate in a nuclear terroristic catastrophe
deepened with the terrorist violence of September 11, 2001.2 The
fact that the international legal regime of nuclear nonproliferation,
founded on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(“NPT” or “Treaty”),3 is inadequate and provides no reliable
protection against the risk of nuclear terrorism by non-State actors
has hung over humanity’s perceptual horizon even longer.4
The preamble of the Treaty bespeaks fear of nuclear wars
and prospects of societal benefits of atomic energy as the impetus
for establishment of the regime.5 Accordingly, the Treaty constrains
non-nuclear states against acquisition and control of nuclear
weapons technology but promises them access to the technology for
peaceful purposes.6 The NPT did not, however, succeed in freeing
the world from the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation or create

1

SARA DALY ET AL., AUM SHINRIKYO, AL QAEDA, AND THE KINSHASA
REACTOR: IMPLICATIONS OF THREE CASE STUDIES FOR COMBATING NUCLEAR
TERRORISM, vii (2005).
2
CHARLES D. FERGUSON & WILLIAM C. POTTER, THE FOUR FACES OF
NUCLEAR TERRORISM 14 (2005).
3
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
4
Joseph F. Pilat, Dealing with Proliferation and Terrorism Involving
WMD, in COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 9, 16–17 (Nathan E. Busch &
Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009).
5
NPT, supra note 3, pmbl. (establishing a global regime by dividing
states into two categories: nuclear-weapon states, which may possess nuclear
weapons; and nonnuclear-weapon states, which undertake not to manufacture or
acquire nuclear weapons).
6
NPT, supra note 3. The NPT framework forbids nuclear states to
transfer weapons technology, id. art. I, and non-nuclear states to manufacture
nuclear weapons and explosive devices. Id. art. II. It encourages nations to nuclear
technology for peaceful uses, id. art. IV, but it also requires non-nuclear weapons
states to submit to the safeguards procedures of the International Atomic Energy
Agency against its diversion for production of nuclear weapons, id. art. III.

3
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a perception in the fairness of its provisions.7 In the post-Cold War
world, non-nuclear weapon states have particularly clamored for
equality in the “bargain.”8 Article VI of the NPT, the disarmament
provision, has particularly been a contentious issue.9 Under article
VI, the NPT binds “[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty” to begin good
faith negotiations to end nuclear arms race and effectuate nuclear
disarmament.10 The fact that nuclear weapons states have largely
ignored article VI has considerably weakened the perception of
fairness of the bargain that the NPT sought to strike between nuclear
weapons states, on the one hand, and non-nuclear weapons states,
on the other. Non-state actors do not figure in the NPT-based
arrangement.11
The question, then, arises as to whether, generally speaking,
non-state actors figure in international law—a question of enduring
interest and discussion among international law scholars. More
narrowly-focused questions are whether international law can
7

See Jaswant Singh, Against Nuclear Apartheid, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 41,
48 (1998) (defending India’s decision to stay outside the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime, denouncing it as a system of “nuclear apartheid”).
8
Nina Tannenwald, Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime, 27 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 299, 302 (2013).
9
Id. (noting that the nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States,
refused to acknowledge in the 2005 Review Conference for the NPT previously
agreed-upon disarmament obligations); see also Wilfred Wan, Why the NPT
Review Conference Outcome Matters, U.N. U. CTR. FOR POL’Y RES. (Mar. 10,
2015),
https://cpr.unu.edu/why-the-npt-review-conference-outcomematters.html. Wilfred pointed out that the failure of the parties to the Treaty to
reach a consensus on disarmament weakens non-nuclear weapon states’
commitment to their side of the bargain. Id.
10
It is unclear why this article is directed toward all parties when, clearly,
only a few states possessed nuclear weapons at that time. In contrast, article I is
specifically directed toward nuclear weapons states, and the two subsequent
articles are specifically directed toward non-nuclear weapons states. See NPT,
supra note 3, arts. I–III.
11
It will be short-sighted to state, however, that the NPT does not at all
limit non-State actors’ opportunities to acquire, build, or transport nuclear
weapons or materials. It does so, indirectly, by delimiting states’ nuclear activities
and by seeking to make diversion of state-controlled nuclear materials detectable
and punishable. It does so also by seeking to crystallize the world consensus that
nuclear weapons must not be allowed to proliferate. The NPT, however, does not
directly reach non-State actors.
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constrain non-state actors’ activities that can potentially lead to
nuclear terrorism and whether international law is capable of
punishing non-state actors if they commit acts of nuclear terrorism.
These are central questions with which this Article deals.
Following the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia in the late
1990s and the generally-perceived failure of the United Nations to
meet the post-Cold War challenges of containing intensified interstate hostilities, scholars both questioned the value of the UNfounded international legal system in creating abiding rules and
norms and realized the ever-greater need for international laws.12
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, scholars expressed
dismay that the terrorists could not be prosecuted under international
law and exhorted in favor of deliberation on holding individual
terrorists culpable under international law through collective
international legal action.13
International law has been continually evolving to respond
to new, emerging realities.14 Over time, the international legal
regime’s primary principles of equality and justice—laid out in the
Charter of the United Nations15—have come to be encoded in
various multilateral treaties concluded under the auspices of the
12

Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl, International Law as Operating and
Normative Systems: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 1 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 2nd ed. 2003);
see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, YALE
L.J. 2599, 2600–01, 2659 (1997) (Faculty Scholarship Series) (concluding that
the processes of international law propel a “normative and constitutive dynamic”
whereby nations interpret global norms—incorporating them into national laws—
and re-shape national interests and national identities); ABRAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 25 (1995) (arguing treaty regimes
unfold a dynamic of compliance through “an iterative process of discourse among
the parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public”).
13
Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal
Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 993–94, 1001 (2001).
14
Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 2 (“International organizations,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and even
private individuals have come to play an increasing role in international relations,
and accordingly international legal rules have evolved to engage these new
actors.”).
15
U.N. Charter pmbl., ¶ 1.

5
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United Nations. Of particular interest to this Article are the treaties
that enshrine humanitarian laws, such as the Geneva Treaties and
their Additional Protocols. Those laws, applicable to state and nonstate actors, in international and non-international armed conflicts,
are legal representation of norms that the U.N. principles helped to
emerge.16 This Article postulates that international law is capable
of advancing the same values in the area of proliferation and use of
nuclear weapons and explosive devices by non-state actors. Those
values can spur further evolution of international law, expanding it
to bring nuclear terrorism within the jurisdiction of international
law, either under the international humanitarian laws or
international laws of nuclear non-proliferation. While gradual
widening of the scope of international law is patently discernable,
this Article proposes the direction of that change. The proposed
modification of international law comports with a “normative
consensus”17 emerging with regard to possession and use of nuclear
weapons.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
A. International Legal Regime of Nuclear Nonproliferation
Soon after the first use of nuclear weapons by the United
States against Japan, international community formed international
law rules to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation among states.
The foundational structure for the international legal regime of
nuclear non-proliferation comprises the NPT and its supporting
organizational arrangement of International Atomic Energy Agency
(“IAEA”) for monitoring compliance of NPT member states with
NPT’s provisions.
The NPT applies directly only to states. It extracts two basic
promises from member states: (1) that nuclear weapons states will
16

For the purposes of this Article, I adopt the Ku and Diehl’s argument
that some normative elements of international law have a “legally binding
character.” Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 12. Their broader postulation is that, in
international law, some underlying values direct the emergence of norms and that
some norms shape behaviors of states and other actors—as opposed to other
norms that might exist in state interactions out of considerations of comity. Id.
17
Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis in original).
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not help non-nuclear weapon states acquire nuclear weapons18 and
(2) that non-nuclear weapon states will not acquire nuclear weapons
and will accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”)
safeguards to ensure that their nuclear activities are undertaken only
for peaceful purposes.19 The NPT, however, acknowledges nations’
right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and promises
that countries possessing nuclear technology will share the
technology with others for peaceful uses.20 Further, the NPT
requires that members shall strive toward cessation of nuclear arms
race and eventual nuclear disarmament.21
As Sievert noted, the NPT struck a “bargain” wherein the
signatory non-nuclear weapon nations were promised access to
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in return for a promise that
they would desist from manufacturing nuclear weapons or
transferring nuclear weapons-related materials and technologies.22
As part of the bargain, the nuclear-weapons states promised to begin
18

NPT, supra note 3, art. I. (“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the
Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices.”).
19
Id. art. II (“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.”).
20
Id. art. IV, ¶ 1 (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting
the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”).
21
Id. art. VI (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.”).
22
Ronald J. Sievert, Working Toward a Legally Enforceable Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Regime, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 93, 93 (2010).

7

IQBAL ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8

PACE INT’L L. REV.

2/27/19 8:23 PM

[Vol. 31:1

good faith negotiations on measures to stop the ongoing nuclear
arms race and, over time, achieve nuclear disarmament.23 The NPT
required, under Article III, non-nuclear weapons signatory states to
submit to the IAEA inspection and verification regime to assure the
international community that they were not diverting nuclear
materials and technologies for belligerent purposes. The NPT-based
regime was amended with the Additional Protocol in 1977 to
supplement the existing IAEA safeguards system. The objective of
the Additional Protocol was to tighten regulations against countries
that, with access to nuclear materials, knowledge, and technologies
that the NPT membership granted, could surrender to temptations to
develop nuclear weapons.
This whole NPT-based arrangement applied to consenting
states that voluntarily agreed to be bound by it. The legal rules of
the NPT-based regime of nuclear nonproliferation have had no
competence for controlling non-state actors’ activities. Thus, in the
context of possible nuclear terrorism, NPT-based international laws
of nuclear nonproliferation are irrelevant, except to the extent that
they seek to control states’ nuclear behaviors, such as transference
of nuclear materials, expertise, and know-how in ways that create
risk of nuclear weapons falling into terrorists’ hands.
B. Perceived Effectiveness of International Legal Regime for
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation
The U.N. Charter does not mention “proliferation,” as the
issue did not exist at the time the document was written. It mentions,
however, “disarmament,” in articles 11, 26, and 47. In article 11(1)
disarmament and regulation of armament appear as principles,
among others, that signatory nations are required to follow and
cooperate upon for maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 26(1) holds the Security Council responsible, with assistance
from the Military Staff Committee, for planning a system of
regulating disarmament. Article 47(1) enjoins the Military Staff
Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on matters
related to regulation and possible disarmament.

23

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1

Id. at 93–94.

8

IQBAL ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

2/27/19 8:23 PM

NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION

9

While under the Covenants of the League of Nations,
disarmament had meant absence of arms,24 under the U.N. Charter,
it came to mean arms control under international law as, by then,
experience had taught that maintenance of a certain level of arsenal
was necessary.25
Soon after the writing of the U.N. Charter, the issue of
nuclear weapons proliferation surfaced, but the Charter made no
distinction between conventional and non-conventional weapons.
Non-proliferation issues, therefore, fell under the general category
of issues regarding arms control.26
The main weakness of international laws, including
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and the one which
renders these laws ineffectual against non-state actors, has been
traditionally regarded as their state-centric character.27 For that
24

Andrew Webster, The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats
and Soldiers in the League of Nations’ Pursuit of International Disarmament,
1920–1938, 14 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 493, 493 (2005).
25
Daniel H. Joyner, Non-proliferation Law and the United Nations
System: Resolution 1540 and the Limits of the Power of the Security Council,
20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 489, 491 (2007).
26
Id.
27
Since early in the development of international law, scholars have
pointed out that the effectiveness of international law lies not in its power of
enforcement of laws but in its influence in regulating international relations and
struggle for power. Unlike a national legal system, where the government
exercises coercive powers over its subjects, international law lacks enforceability
due to the consent requirement for its enforcement measures, its decentralized
character, the imprecise nature of its obligations, the varied interpretations of law
that nations are able to construe to suit their individual interests, and the multiple
ways in which nations can implement the law to fit their preferences and purposes.
It follows that an individual perpetrator of a crime like nuclear terrorism can be
punished by the state of which the individual is subject: international law does not
directly reach the individual—at least not as yet. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU ET
AL., POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 293–327
(7th ed. 1978); see also Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in
International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 419–420, 441 (1983) (discerning in
the last quarter of the twentieth century, a shift in the axis of general international
law from states to the community of states for directing expansion of binding
international legal rules). Bederman wrote in the early twenty-first century that
the international legal order is still state-centered. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE
SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2002); Ku and Diehl, supra note 12, at 2
(noting that the scope of international law has expanded to include international

9
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reason, with its focus on states, the NPT does not represent the
dominant legal and political approach when significance of nonstate actors striving for dominance with nuclear weapons has
increased.28 Former United States President Barack Obama
conveyed this sense to the world in his 2009 speech in Prague, Czech
Republic, in which he all but conceded to the failure of the global
non-proliferation regime in the new context, noting “[t]errorists are
determined to buy, build or steal [nuclear weapons]. Our efforts to
contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation
regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could
reach the point where the center cannot hold.”29
In our times, there exist ongoing concerns regarding nuclear
terrorism.30 With little confidence that the international legal regime

organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational
corporations, and even private individuals). Not many international legal scholars
would yet say, though, that individuals are direct subjects of international law.
28
See David P. Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: End of the Arms Control Approach?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 39, 64 (2004) (arguing that the state-centric focus in the WMD policies are
anachronistic with rise of the threat of WMD terrorism).
29
Barack Obama, Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague (Apr.
5, 2009) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered)
(indicating
a
conviction that the existing global non-proliferation system is inadequate to meet
the threat of nuclear terrorism).
30
The Washington Post, Nuclear Terrorism FAQ, HARV. KENNEDY SCH.
FOR
SCI. & INT’L AFF. BELFER CTR. (Sept.
26,
2007),
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-terrorism-faq. The Harvard
Kennedy School’s Belfer Center finds it plausible that terrorists can acquire
nuclear weapons and commit nuclear terrorism: “Unfortunately, terrorist use of a
nuclear bomb is a very real danger . . . Published estimates of the chance that
terrorists will detonate a nuclear bomb in a U.S. city over the next ten years range
from 1 percent to 50 percent. In a 2005 poll of international security experts taken
by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the median estimate of the chance of a nuclear
attack in the next ten years was 29 percent—and a strong majority believed that it
was more likely that terrorists would launch a nuclear attack than that a state
would. Given the horrifying consequences of such an attack, even a 1 percent
chance would be enough to call for rapid action to reduce the risk.” Id.; see also
William C. Potter, The NPT and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint, 2 AM. ACAD.
ARTS & SCI. 68, 81 (2010) (arguing that the Treaty’s inattentiveness to non-State
actors who have risen either as suppliers or potential end-users of nuclear
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of nuclear nonproliferation, based on the NPT and its
complementary verification regime under the IAEA, can reach nonstate actors,31 many scholars of nuclear terrorism express dismay:
they are certain that terrorists will seek and use nuclear weapons to
terrorize without impediment from international law. Albright and
Hinderstein, for instance, argued that the inability of the global
nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the NPT-based system
and the system of international export controls, to detect private
individuals’ and groups’ clandestine nuclear activities—such as
those of the A. Q. Khan network, which violated global
nonproliferation objectives by large scale black market trading of
nuclear technologies and material around the world—attests to
inadequacy of the system.32 These scholars argue that international
legal tools are fraught with gaps that make nuclear security
precarious, with the possibility that terrorists may gain ability to
acquire and use nuclear weapons.33 With heightening perception of
the possibility of nuclear terrorism, skeptics doubted whether the
international legal system of nuclear nonproliferation could survive
the prevailing conditions of the twenty-first century.34 When
scholars, such as Graham Allison, listed ways of preventing possible
technology, materials, and weapons is one critical challenge that the NPT faces
and which may cause the NPT-based regime’s demise).
31
Gilles Arbellot du Repaire, The Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation
Treaty and Terrorism: The Consequences of 11 September 2001 on the Treaty
Review Process, 71 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 15, 17 (2003).
32
David Albright & Corey Hinderstein, Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and
Future Proliferation Networks, 28 WASH. Q. 111, 111 (2005).
33
Id. at 111, 113.
34
MITCHELL B. REISS, COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY ix–xv (Nathan
Busch & Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009) (noting the following current conditions
that substantiate the doubt regarding efficacy of the NPT in the 21st century:
“ongoing political and technical hurdles to corralling and safeguarding the nuclear
materials and weapons of the former Soviet Union; concerns over the safety and
security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal; anxieties over the spread of increasingly
sophisticated, dual-use biotechnology capabilities; spread of medium- and longrange missiles around the world; fears over the possible acquisition of nuclear
weapons or radioactive materials by terrorist groups; and variegated challenges to
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspections system, and regional security by the nuclear ambitions of
North Korea and Iran”).

11
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nuclear terrorism attempts, they did not take into account the NPTbased international legal regime.35 The NPT-based system was not
designed to deal with subnational terrorism and it does not.
C. International Attempts to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism Through
Other Legal Measures
With the rise of fear of nuclear terrorism, particularly after
the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the international community
scrambled to develop other measures to hinder possible attempts by
non-state actors to acquire and use nuclear weapons.36 The
international community has sought to close gaps in the current
international nuclear nonproliferation laws through various
unilateral and multilateral measures, initiatives, and proposals; the
growing trend is to establish remedial measures and standards
outside the NPT-based nuclear nonproliferation regime.37
35

See Graham Allison, How to Stop Nuclear Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFF.
64, 68–74 (2004). Allison concurs with President Bush’s characterization of
nuclear terror as the “defining threat the [United States now] face[s].” Id. at 64.
The scholar proposes a national security strategy “based on the "Three No's": no
loose nukes, no nascent nukes, and no new nuclear states.” Id. at 65. It is clear
that neither the politician, President Bush, nor the scholar, Graham, considered
international legal remedies to address the possibility of nuclear terrorism. See
also MITCHELL B. REISS, COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 1 (Nathan Busch &
Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009) (pointing out that the dominant method of preventing
nuclear terrorism is state control of sensitive materials through national and
international political and legal frameworks). States have, clearly, not considered
remedies founded on the NPT-based international legal system to prevent the
feared nuclear terrorism.
36
Robert Litwk, Preventing a Nuclear 9/11: State-Based Strategies to
Deter
Non-State
Threats,
LAWFARE
(July
30,
2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/preventing-nuclear-911-state-based-strategiesdeter-non-state-threats. Litwak writes that, following 9/11, the threats of nuclear
terrorism led to re-consideration of the two classical deterrence strategies—
deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Id. The former entails
punitive responses, and the latter seeks to block acquisition of means to conduct
terrorism. Following 9/11, state cooperation emerged as a new, dominant
deterrence strategy instead.
37
See Saira Bano & Srini Sitaraman, The Nuclear Security Regime and
Nuclear
Terror,
THE
DIPLOMAT
(May
7,
2016),

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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D. Multilateral Efforts
The post-Cold War fears of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(“WMD”) terrorism led the United Nations General Assembly to
establish an ad hoc committee with the mandate “to elaborate an
international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings
and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression
of acts of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing
international instruments, and thereafter to address means of further
developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions
dealing with international terrorism[.]”38 The ad hoc committee’s
work resulted in conclusion of three treaties under the auspices of
the U.N. General Assembly: the International Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted in 1997 and entered
into force in 2001);39 the International Convention for the
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (adopted in 1999 and entered
into force in 2002);40 and the International Convention on the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (adopted in 2005 and
entered into force in 2007).41 The preamble of the International
Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
specifically states that “acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the
gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace
and security . . . [and] that existing multilateral legal provisions do
not adequately address those attacks[.]”42
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, a series of multilateral state efforts emerged to address the
heightened fear of nuclear terrorism including:
https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/is-the-nuclear-security-regime-doing-enoughto-stop-nuclear-terror/.
38
G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 9 (Dec. 17, 1996).
39
G.A. Res. 52/164, annex (Dec. 15, 1997); International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 12, 1998, 2149 U.N.T.S. 259 (entered
into force May 23, 2001).
40
G.A. Res. 54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999); International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197
(entered into force Apr. 10, 2002).
41
G.A. Res. 59/290 (Apr. 13, 2005); International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Sept. 14, 2005, 2245 U.N.T.S. 89
(entered into force July 7, 2007).
42
Id. pmbl.
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IAEA’s Plan of Activities outlined in GOV/2002/10 to
prevent nuclear terrorism: In 2002, the Board of Governors
of the IAEA approved a three-year Plan of Activities
concerning IAEA’s nuclear security activities, such as those
related to prevent theft of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
weapons-related materials and attacks on nuclear facilities.
The Agency acknowledged, however, that the primary
responsibility for the protection of nuclear weapons and
materials lay with states and that the Agency’s assistance is
circumscribed by scope permitted by each state;43
The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction, 2002: The Partnership
sought to raise and spend fund on activities to support nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;44
Amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Materials: Among other things, the
Convention created expanded duties for states to secure
nuclear materials in storage and during transit and to
criminalize sabotage against civilian nuclear facilities
(2005).45

43

Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Nuclear Security—Measures to
Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/50-GC(48)/6 (Aug.
11, 2004).
44
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction ("10 Plus 10 Over 10 Program"), NTI,
https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/global-partnership-againstspread-weapons-and-materials-mass-destruction-10-plus-10-over-10-program/
(last visited Dec. 25, 2018).
45
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Nuclear Security—Measures to
Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism: Amendment to the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2005/10GC(49)/INF/6 (Sept. 6, 2005); see also Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA],
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, in
IAEA International Law Series No. 2 (2006) (establishing legally-binding
measures for the prevention, detection, and punishment of offenses relating to
nuclear material). The 2005 amendment sought to strengthen its provisions for
protecting nuclear facilities and materials being used, stored, or transported for
peaceful domestic purposes. The added article 2A 1(b) of the amendment calls on

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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In the post-9/11 times, multilateral efforts accelerated
particularly rapidly following President Obama’s speech in 2009 at
Prague, in which the U.S. President declared nuclear terrorism as
“the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”46 The
speech called on states to set new standards and cooperate in new
partnerships to protect nuclear materials.47 However, the standards
that emerged are general and lack enforceability.48
Since President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, there have
been four Nuclear Security Summits. The Summits sought to secure
nuclear materials, including stockpiles of highly enriched uranium
(“HEU”) and plutonium, in several countries and to increase border,
airports, and ports security through use of sophisticated technology
and international cooperative efforts.49 The various international
treaties, organizations, and initiatives that emerged as a result of the
Summits, constituting the current international security regime, rely
on voluntary engagement of participating countries.50 These treaties
require states to judicially and logistically cooperate with one
another to prevent terrorism and to punish terrorists. For instance,
the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism criminalizes nuclear terrorism under domestic laws of
state parties and through promotion of inter-state police and judicial
cooperation for investigating and punishing individuals’ acts of
intentional and unlawful possession and use of nuclear device and
radiological materials to threaten or harm other persons.51
In the wake of the discovery of the A. Q. Khan’s illicit
nuclear proliferation network, former U.S. President George Bush’s
Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”) is another testimony to lack
of confidence in the existing system. The PSI is a U.S.-led
states to expand the scope of inter-state cooperation on measures to recover stolen
or smuggled nuclear material, inter alia.
46
Obama, supra note 29.
47
Id.
48
George Bunn, Enforcing International Standards: Protecting Nuclear
Materials from Terrorists Post-9/11, 37 ARMS CONTROL TODAY (Jan./Feb. 2007).
49
Bano & Sitaraman, supra note 37.
50
Id.
51
See International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, supra note 41, arts. 2, 6, 14.
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international effort to interdict WMD-related shipments and stop
proliferation-related financing. A coalition of eleven states took
matters in their hands—so to speak—in self-defense through the
multilateral cooperation initiative of PSI to prevent terrorists from
acquiring nuclear weapons or their materials: the PSI prevents
sensitive shipments to suspected destinations. The PSI is
a regime . . . designed for a new era,
recognizing that proliferation threats
today are different than those in the
decades when the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) was
negotiated and supplier regimes such
as the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) and the Australia Group were
established.52
In designing the tool of interdiction to respond to the challenge of
nuclear weapons proliferation, the drafters of the Statement of
Interdiction Principles claimed to have built the PSI upon existing
treaties and regimes and under Security Council’s authority to
address situations that threaten world peace and security, i.e., under
general international law.53
Measures devised by multilateral treaties remain of
uncertain kinship with international law. The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), which codified the pre-existing
general law on the subject to treaties, states in article 26—entitled
Pacta Sunt Servanda (“agreements must be kept”): “Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith.”54 As such, treaties do not create obligations on nonparties. Under this view of treaties, scholars favor positivist
construction of international law rules, stating that “[s]tate consent
52

Andrew C. Winner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New
Face of Interdiction, 28 WASH. Q. 129, 130 (2005).
53
Fact Sheet: Statement of Interdiction Principles, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2018).
54
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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is the foundation of international law. The principle that law is
binding on a state only by its consent remains an axiom of the
political system, an implication of State autonomy.”55 International
law, according to this viewpoint, emerged for states by their consent.
This viewpoint leaves non-state actors, lacking competence to
consent to formation and implementation of international laws,
outside the pale of international law. The treaties mentioned in this
section are indirect attempts to hold non-state actors, specifically,
possible nuclear terrorists, responsible and culpable under
international law.
E. U.N. Security Council Resolutions
Alongside multilateral treaties, summits, and other related
inter-country activities, often sponsored by the United Nations
system, the Security Council also passed some resolutions with the
objective to prevent nuclear terrorism. In the post-Cold War times,
most Security Council resolutions sought to respond to specific
situations and to direct action toward specific countries for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.56 Two
resolutions, Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1540, however,
purported to legally bind nations to tasks related to anti-terrorism.
Resolution 1373, passed on 28 September 2001, under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, responded to the September 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States, affirming that “such acts, like
any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international
55

Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors,
Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKLEY J. INT’L
L. 137, 141 n.14 (2005) (quoting Louis Henkin, General Course on Public
International Law, in IV RECUEIL DES COURS 46 (1989)).
56
Joyner, supra note 25, at 506 (“[I]n each case the Council acted in
response to a situation that had arisen in international relations.”); see, e.g., S.C.
Res. 1696, ¶ 2 (July 31, 2006) (demanding that Iran cease uranium enrichment
activities by a deadline); S.C. Res. 687 (addressing Iraq’s alleged possession and
threatened use of chemical and biological weapons); S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2 (Nov. 29,
1990) (authorizing U.N. member states to use military force to expel Iraqi forces
from Kuwait. There had been other Resolutions also with regard to other places,
such as the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq. Those resolutions undertook enforcement
action under the existing international law.
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peace and security.”57 The Resolution characterizes the attacks as
an “act of international terrorism” and calls on states to work
together toward prevention of such acts in the future by denying
access to funding and any other form of active or passive support to
terrorists in their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and by
developing a system of border controls and early warning, among
other measures.
Later, the Security Council Resolution 1540 unanimously
passed on April 28, 2004, shortly after the discovery of the A. Q.
Khan nuclear materials smuggling network.58 The Resolution
expresses concern that non-state actors “may acquire, develop,
traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their
means of delivery” or engage in “illicit trafficking.”59 In expressly
relating Resolution 1540 to non-state actors, the Security Council,
interestingly, refers to those non-state actors that the Security
Council Resolution 1373 had recognized, the ones involved in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.
Resolution 1540 requires extensive commitments from the
U.N. member states. The Resolution welcomes multilateral efforts
to deal with the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction in the context of non-state actors. It exhorts states to
cooperate in dealing with the threat of WMD terrorism emanating
from non-state actors, forbidding states to support, directly or
indirectly, private actors. It calls on states to “develop and maintain
appropriate effective physical protection measures”60 to protect
nuclear materials and facilities; to enact and enforce national laws
to prevent the proliferation of WMD to non-state actors; and “[t]o
promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where
necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are

57

S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001).
S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); see also Nuclear scientist asks
forgiveness,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
4,
2004,
9:07
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/04/pakistan?INTCMP=ILCNETT
XT3487.
59
S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 58, pmbl.
60
Id. ¶ 3(b).
58
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parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons.”61
Resolution 1540 also mandates legally-binding obligations
upon states. While recognizing that member states are already
bound by treaties and other legal commitments to prevent
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and
to protect critical materials, the Resolution urges states to do more
to fully discharge their international legal obligations.62 It requires
states to cooperate with one another, such as by coordinating efforts
on border and export controls or by offering assistance to states that
lack needed resources, to prevent illicit trafficking of WMD
weapons and related sensitive materials.
Importantly, the
Resolution requires that states criminalize WMD proliferation
attempts by non-state actors and create an international network of
cooperation and coordination to check infractions. Significantly, the
Resolution did not mention or refer to the NPT-based nuclear
nonproliferation regime. The omission implies that the Security
Council regarded the NPT as irrelevant for the purposes of nuclear
non-proliferation by non-state actors.
The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and
1540, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative, are examples
of such measures that international community took as the world
faced a rising threat of nuclear terrorism. Currently, it is clear the
world community relies on these and similar other initiatives, as
well as multilateral treaties, in seeking safety against nuclear
terrorism and to limit its prospect. Quietly bypassing the NPT-based
nuclear nonproliferation regime of international laws, these
instruments were designed to seek legitimation for international
community’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts against non-state
actors under the general international law, not under the specific
international regime of nuclear nonproliferation. Regardless of the
source of legal authority for these attempts, however, it is clear that
the efforts of:

61
62

Id. ¶ 8(a).
Id. ¶ 2.
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[t]he diverse collection of specific
efforts to address this threat, such as
securing the weapons of the former
Soviet Union, export controls, the
Proliferation Security Initiative and
national anti-terrorism legislation,
bespeak the ad hoc and sporadic
nature of contemporary response to a
hard reality not contemplated when
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
was designed.63
F. Legality of Resolutions 1373 and 1540
The articles of the U.N. Charter that mention disarmament
shed light on the role of the General Assembly and the Security
Council in the international system, an understanding of which is
vital to comprehension of the legal controversy regarding passage
of Resolution 1540. Article 11(1) of the U.N. Charter gives the
General Assembly the authority to “consider,” i.e., deliberate, “the
general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international
peace and security” and, possibly, “make recommendations . . . to
the Members or to the Security Council or to both.” Thus, under
article 11(1), the General Assembly is to receive input of diverse
perspectives.64 Under this understanding of the role of the General
Assembly, when General Assembly’s first Resolution passed on
January 24, 1946—under the title “Establishment of a Commission
to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic
Energy”—the General Assembly created the Atomic Energy
Commission whose mandated task was to “enquire into all phases
of the problem” and to make recommendations to the Security
Council.65
63

Jack I. Garvey, A New Architecture for The Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 339, 344 (2007).
64
See also Joyner, supra note 25, at 493 (noting “[t]he AEC [Atomic
Energy Commission] was given a mandate to ‘proceed with utmost despatch and
inquire into all phases of the problem’ of the discovery of atomic energy, and to
make specific proposals”).
65
G.A. Res. 1 (I), ¶ 5 (Jan. 24, 1946).
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When the Security Council finds that a breach or threat of
breach of peace exists, it proceeds to act in limited ways, in
accordance with the guidelines that the U.N. Charter provides.
Article 26 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council to
formulate plans, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee,
established under the U.N. Charter article 47.66 The plans, based on
General Assembly’s recommendations of general principles of
cooperation, are for regulation of armaments (states’ weapons), so
as “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international
peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the
world's human and economic resources.”67 Clearly, the idea of
formulation of plans relates to states and not to private actors as the
latter were not regarded as within the purview of the International
system and had not figured as prominently as now they have. Joyner
argues that the U.N. Charter article 26 plans
are to compose a coherent ‘system’
for the regulation of armaments,
which would imply that the plans to
be authored by the Council using this
power are not to be situation-specific,
as in the case of an ad hoc response to
a discrete event in international
affairs. Rather, these plans are to form
the basis for a universally applicable,
66

U.N. Charter art. 26 (“In order to promote the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for
armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council
shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee referred to in article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the
United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation "of
armaments.”); see also Joyner, supra note 25, at 495 (arguing that, while article
26 confers powers to the Security Council, it also makes Security Council’s role
as complementary to that of the General Assembly in the exercise of General
Assembly’s deliberative role under article 11(1)). Joyner points out that article
11(1) also envisions such complementarity in General Assembly’s deliberative
role concerning consideration of “general principles of cooperation” with respect
to maintenance of international peace. Id. at 494.
67
U.N. Charter art. 26.
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enduring system of ‘practical and
effective’
international
arms
68
control.”
That is, Security Council’s plans for maintenance of international
peace and security are to be formed with assistance from the Military
Staff Committee, and, once the plans are completed, they are to be
submitted to the U.N. Members for approval. Those plans for the
execution of which all members of the United Nations have to agree
can refer only to a system of universal application, not one for
specific situations.
Comparing U.N. Charter articles 11(1) and 26, Joyner notes that
while Article 11(1) is in keeping with
a principled notion of universal
participation by . . . [all] states in the
construction
of
fundamental
principles . . . [to] order relations
among states in the area of
international arms control, Article 26
is a recognition of the practical
exigencies of international politics
which demand that the Security
Council, despite its unrepresentative
character, have a vital role in the
construction of plans for an
international arms control system. . . .
[T]he Security Council under Article
26 only has the power to formulate
plans. It must then submit those plans
to the member states of the United
Nations for their approval and for
establishment through multilateral
treaty as actual legal principles
governing their relationships with
68

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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each other. The Security Council’s
plans in and of themselves have no
binding force on members, and are
merely hortatory offerings, although
endowed with the gravitas of having
been generated through the Charter
system for creation of arms control
law . . . . Thus under the Charter
system member states retain their full
sovereignty over decisions to enter
into legal relationships in the area of
international arms control. This right
is not subsumed under the Council’s
decision-making
powers
under
Article 25 nor under its broad powers
to maintain international peace and
security under the articles of Chapter
VII.69
In other words, neither the General Assembly nor the Security
Council can create new law for member states of the United Nations.
Rather, the role of these two organs of the United Nations is that of
“facilitating co-operation and co-ordination between member states
in reaching concrete agreements on the regulation of armaments.”70
For the purposes of this Article, the Security Council does not
possess the legal capacity to make new rules for member states.71
69

Id. at 496; see also U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter.”).
70
Joyner, supra note 25, at 497.
71
The Security Council of the United Nations also enjoys limited
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Security Council
may “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression,” under U.N. Charter art. 39, recommend provisional measures
to parties to resolve the dispute, id. art. 40, decide non-military measures, in case
the provisional measures prove to be ineffective, id. art. 41, or decide to take
military measures as an exception to article 2(4), id. art. 42. Those powers are not
at issue in the context of nuclear terrorism. The fact that they are limited might,
however, constrain Council’s hands in taking effective action on the matter of
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The Security Council does not have legislative powers: “[n]either
the Charter nor its preparatory materials evidence an intention to
establish the Council as a legislative organ.”72
The adoption of Resolution 1373 seems to have been a
benchmark in international law; with it, the Security Council
assumed a legislative role later to reinforce it by the adoption of
Resolution 1540.73 Joyner argued against the jurisdictional legality
of both Resolutions 1373 and 1540, pointing out that their passage
reflected a shift in Security Council’s role and powers unwarranted
under article 25 of the U.N. Charter,74 making the passage of both
nuclear terrorism. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). Theoretically, article 2(4)
also constrains states from using force to quell threat of nuclear terrorism or actual
nuclear terrorism by non-state terrorists operating from the territory of another
state–unless the latter state’s conduct in exacerbating the threat or terroristic
actions of non-state actors is implicated. International law in this area is still
evolving. At this time, it is not clearly foreseeable whether the Security Council
can be empowered to take military measures against a state from whose territory
threat of nuclear weapon by non-state actors unsupported by their state in the
issuance of the threat. See also Joyner, supra note 25, at 504.
72
Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the
Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions,
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59, 61 (2005).
73
See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature,
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 175 (2005); see also VICTOR V. RAMRAJ ET AL., The
Impossibility of Global Anti-Terrorism Law?, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW
AND POLICY 44 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2012). In the days
immediately after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, “the Bush administration
went to the UN Security Council and obtained a novel legal instrument,
Resolution 1373 . . . In one fell swoop, the Security Council assumed the role of
an international legislative body, and assumed the power to monitor domestic
legislative compliance.” Id. at 44–45. As a practical matter, however, the impacts
of Resolution 1373, as Ramraj describes them, have not been altogether
insalubrious. The Resolution spurred a number of states to promulgate,
implement, and coordinate national anti-terrorism laws. Id. at 45–46. As a result,
anti-terrorism laws of some states, such as the U.K., have emerged as models for
other nations to follow, helping shape nascent legal norms in state practice
concerning anti-terrorism. Id. at 45. Ramraj suggests that, following passage of
the Resolution 1373, the existence of a coherent global anti-terrorism law might
be assumed. Id. The result, if true, owes nothing to the NPT.
74
Joyner, supra note 25, at 515.
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Resolutions ultra vires acts on Security Council’s part.75 Curiously,
the President of the Security Council was conscious of the fact that
the organization was acting outside the scope of its authority.76
Security Council has vast powers under Chapter VII, to
protect international peace and security through binding
enforcement measures, including some discretionary powers.77 Yet
all powers must rest on some legal source. In 2003, during the
process of adoption of Resolution 1483, concerning the status of
occupying forces in Iraq, the President of the Security Council stated
concerning the delegation of certain powers by the Security Council
to the occupying Powers that
under the Charter the powers
delegated by the Security Council
under this resolution are not openended or unqualified. They should be
exercised in ways that conform with
“the principles of justice and
international law” mentioned in
Article 1 of the Charter, and
especially in conformity with the
Geneva Conventions and the
Hague.78
75
76

Id.
Press

Conference by Security Council President, PRESS
BRIEFING
(2004),
https://www.un.org/news/briefings/docs/2004/pleugerpc.DOC.htm (last visited
Dec. 15, 2018) (expressing concern on the possibility of terrorism involving
weapons of mass destruction and the inability of international law to prevent it);
see also Alyona Zhuk, Experts praise Poroshenko’s call for restrictions on UN
Security Council veto powers, KYIV POST (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:24 PM),
https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/kyiv-post-plus/experts-praiseporoshenkos-call-for-restrictions-on-un-security-council-veto-powers399497.html (arguing that the Big Power veto power in the Security Council has
defeated many potential Security Council actions).
77
Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra
Vires or Ultra Innovative? 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 542, 553–54 (2004).
78
Transcript of Speeches Regarding the Situation Between Iraq and
Kuwait, 4761st Meeting of the Security Council, at 11–12 (Mar. 22, 2003),
http://undocs.org/en/S/PV.4761.
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This pronouncement leaves little doubt that the Security Council’s
authority under Chapters VI and VII is circumscribed by the general
principles given in the Charter of the U.N. and by the codification
of these principles in such international instruments as the Geneva
Convention. A corollary of this fact is that any deviation from these
principles and laws amounts to commission of ultra vires acts of the
kind that the Security Council is blamed for in its passage of
Resolutions 1373 and 1540, as noted above.
Security Council’s resort to such acts was a desperate
attempt to address the non-universality problem of the U.N. nuclear
non-proliferation system.79 While the existing international system
does not universally bind all states, operating on voluntary
subscription by states, the Security Council sought to impose on
states affirmative duties to which they had not agreed.80 Powers of
international institutions, including those of the Security Council,
however, are circumscribed by limits to which member states agree
since consent of states, enshrined in constituent instruments, such as
the Charter of the United Nations, is the basis of international law
and the constitutionality of international institutions.81 Both
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 illegally cross those limits. These
attempts to address the issue of threat of nuclear weapons are,
therefore, legally unsound.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW’S REACH TO NUCLEAR TERRORISTS
A. Individual Responsibility in International Law
Traditionally, under the classical, realist theory of
international relations, states are considered to be the primary actors
in the international system, and international law’s primary purpose

79

Joyner, supra note 25, at 508.
Talmon, supra note 73, at 175; see also Rosand, supra note 77, at 548–
49 (supporting Security Council’s efforts to act as a global legislator through
passage of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 as pragmatic measures for dealing with the
new threat of global terrorism).
81
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 218–20 (1995).
80
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is deemed to be regulation of relationship between states.82 In
agreement with this idea, scholars have noted that “[s]tates made
international law and were accountable to each other in meeting
international legal obligations.”83 The law of state responsibility,
which is at the center of international law, “provides that every
internationally wrongful act entails the responsibility of the state
. . . Beyond this very general pronouncement, however, the law of
state responsibility appears unsettled and has generated considerable
theoretical debates and practical difficulties.”84
Traditionally, individuals have remained invisible in
international law, screened from responsibility for commission of
acts, a situation that has eroded perception of international law’s
competence in meeting challenges of non-state actors’ undesirable
acts.85 With input from legal scholars and practitioners, however,
international law has progressed; it has been evolving, slowly, to
make room for individual responsibility. In 1950, Lauterpacht
argued that “there is cogency in the view that unless responsibility
is imputed and attached to persons of flesh and blood, it rests with
no one.”86 With reference to non-state actors’ responsibility under
international law, in 1956, International Law Commission’s report
on state responsibility under international law maintained that it was
"necessary to change and adapt traditional law so that it will reflect
the profound transformation which has occurred in international law
. . . [and] to bring the 'principles governing State responsibility' into
line with international law at its present stage of development.”87
82

Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States,
6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 507 (1995).
83
Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first
Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 798 (2002).
84
RENE PROVOST, STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(2002).
85
André Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility
and State Responsibility in International Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 615, 617–
18 (2003).
86
HERSH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
40 (1950).
87
Documents of the eighth session including the report of the
Commission to the General Assembly [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n annex, 173,
176, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96.
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That early concern about holding individuals responsible under
international law for wrongful acts continued to echo in the
international law scholarship in subsequent decades:
The subjects of international law are
states but only in the sense that the
present conceptual structure of
international law attaches legal rights
and duties to the category “state.” . . .
The subjects of international law, in
the sense of those for whose benefit
the law assigns all rights and duties,
are the people of the world. The
wrongful act of a state is the wrongful
act of one set of human beings in
relation to another set of human
beings. . . . The moral effect of the
law is vastly reduced if the human
agents involved are able to separate
themselves personally both from the
duties the law imposes and from the
responsibility it entails.88
In line with these concerns and realizations, “[t]he legal nature of
international law is perennially in question.”89
Today, international law and the concept of responsibility in
it have changed to reflect state actors’ growing role. International
law has now, under specific international agreements or under
customary international law, extended to individuals and other nonstate entities the right to invoke state responsibility, the
responsibility owed to them by their own state or by other states.90
Following this development,

88

Philip Allott, State Responsibility and Unmaking of International Law,
29 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 14 (1988).
89
PROVOST, supra note 84, at Introduction.
90
Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First
Century, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 798, 798–99 (2002).
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[a] large number of criminal law
treaties, prosecutions of individuals in
national and international courts and
the establishment of the International
Criminal
Court
have
taken
individuals away from behind the
shield of the state. International law
leaves it no longer to the national
legal order to determine which
individuals
are
subjected
to
obligations and responsibilities and
confronts individuals now directly
with legal consequences of their
acts.91
Nollkaemper further wrote “[a]s of yet, the individualisation of
responsibility takes the form of international criminal responsibility.
However, there is no principled reason why it could not also
manifest itself in international civil responsibility.”92 This thought
reflects scholarly acceptance, if not purposeful guidance, of the
steadily emerging change with respect to the concept of
responsibility under international law.
Along the path of this progression in international law,
certain individual acts carry individual responsibility alongside state
responsibility.93 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal
for Nuremberg recognized individual responsibility early on in the
context of trials for war crimes. The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for Nuremberg recognized individual
responsibility early on in the context of trials for war crimes. The
judges at Nuremberg wrote as they punished Nazi leader for their
crimes: “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men,
not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
91

Nollkaemper, supra note 85, at 618.
92
Id. at 618 n.14.
93
See generally id. at 617–18 (arguing that the law of state
responsibility has expanded to include individual responsibility side by side
state responsibility in its domain).
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enforced.”94 The Nuremberg Trial is claimed to have strengthened
the notion that international law can and should punish individuals
for certain heinous crimes through exercise of jurisdiction of
international courts, and, in doing so, “rejected historically used
defenses based on state sovereignty.”95 The U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 95, entitled “Affirmation of the Principles of
International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nurnburg
[Nuremberg] Tribunal” acknowledged that the principles of the
Nuremberg Charter were principles of international law.96 Thus,
early on, international law evinced signs of favor for holding
individuals responsible for certain acts.
B. Prosecution of Individuals under International Human Rights
Law and under International Humanitarian Law
International human rights law, while prominently
recognizing individual rights and freedoms, does not overlook
individual duties to the community. Concerning human rights, for
instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)
foresees “the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy
. . . freedom from fear” and makes it a state obligation to ensure that
human rights and freedoms are protected through domestic justice
system.97 The UDHR mentions individual responsibility indirectly:
article 29 of the UDHR states that “[e]veryone has duties to the
community. . . .” Article 29(2) of UDHR reads further in part that
94

William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in NonInternational Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 906, 906 (2002).
95
ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR., The Influence of the Nuremberg Trial on
International Criminal Law, https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-andwriting/the-influence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/ (last
visited Dec. 18, 2018). “The Nuremberg trials established that all of humanity
would be guarded by an international legal shield and that even a Head of State
would be held criminally responsible and punished for aggression and Crimes
Against Humanity. The right of humanitarian intervention to put a stop to Crimes
Against Humanity – even by a sovereign against his own citizens – gradually
emerged from the Nuremberg principles affirmed by the United Nations.” Id.
96
G.A. Res. 95 (I) (Dec. 11, 1946).
97
G.A. Res. 217 A (III), pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948); see id. art. 29, ¶ 1
(“Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.”).
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“[i]n the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others.”
The Declaration, being an expression of principles, does not
bind states or persons.98 The UDHR are statements of peoples’
commitment to human rights under the United Nations Charter.99
The norms that the UDHR embodies are, however, incorporated in
several international agreements and treaties. Over time,
[m]any of the Universal Declaration's
provisions also have become
incorporated
into
customary
international law, which is binding on
all states. This development has been
confirmed
by
states
in
intergovernmental and diplomatic
settings; in arguments submitted to
judicial tribunals, by the actions of

98

Eleanor Roosevelt, Address to the United Nations General Assembly
on the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 9, 1948)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/HumanRightsSP10/CourseDocs
/2EleanorRoosevelt.pdf) (“It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It
is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation. It is a
Declaration of basic principles of human rights and freedoms, . . . to serve as a
common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations. . . This Universal
Declaration of Human Rights may well become the international Magna Carta of
all men everywhere.”).
99
See U.N. Charter art. 55(c) (“[T]he United Nations shall promote . . .
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”); see also Hurst
Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National
and International Law. 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 352–53 (1995) (“Legally
and politically, it is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which defines the
Charter's human rights provisions. As the primary source of the global consensus
on human rights––which was reaffirmed in the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna––the Declaration represents the only common ground when
many states discuss human rights.”).
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intergovernmental organizations; and
in the writings of legal scholars.100
The major international instruments incorporating the UDHR
norms/rights are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1976,101 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, 1976.102 Other specific human rights
international treaties that elaborate upon some UDHR rights include
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which entered into force in
1987.103 Notably, following suit and referring to the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirmed everyone’s
rights to social, cultural, and economic freedoms and noted that “the
enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of
duties on the part of everyone.”104
Many other international human rights instruments that hold
solely states responsible, however, do not hold people responsible
for committing atrocities.
Most still expand the idea of
responsibility under international law. The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, for instance,
affirms that genocide is an international crime for the Contracting

100

Hannum, supra note 99, at 289.
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976).
102
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), annex (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976).
103
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force
June 26, 1987).
104
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights pmbl., June 27, 1981,
1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force on Oct. 21, 1986) (explicitly referring to
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which affirms that everyone has right to enjoy social, cultural, and economic
freedoms). The Charter also considered that “the enjoyment of rights and
freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone. Id.; see
also arts. 27–29 (concerning individuals’ duties).
101
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Parties whether committed in time of war or in time of peace.105 The
Convention, thus, expands the scope of applicability of the law of
responsibility from war context to peace situations; it places
obligation, however, upon signatory states, not individuals, to
prevent genocide. The International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,106 similarly, makes persons
only indirectly responsible for commission of atrocious acts by
holding states primarily responsible for racial discrimination against
persons. The contracting parties of the International Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
likewise, undertake to uphold the UDHR freedoms and rights by
enacting appropriate legislation to punish violators.107 The
105

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (“The Contracting Parties
undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention
and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or
of any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”); see id. art. III (including
genocide as well as attempt, incitement, conspiracy, complicity of genocide).
106
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Paying regard to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention binds the contracting state parties
to declare in article 4(a) “an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well
as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of
persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance
to racist activities, including the financing thereof.”); id. art. 4(b) (stating that state
contracting parties “[s]hall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or
activities as an offence punishable by law.”).
107
The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid art. IV, July 18, 1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244 [hereinafter
Apartheid Convention] (“The States Parties to the present Convention undertake:
(a) To adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as well as to
prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist
policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of that crime; (b) To
adopt legislative, judicial and administrative measures to prosecute, bring to trial
and punish in accordance with their jurisdiction persons responsible for, or
accused of, the acts defined in article II of the present Convention, whether or not
such persons reside in the territory of the State in which the acts are committed or
are nationals of that State or of some other State or are stateless persons.”).
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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment similarly, obligates state parties to
criminalize individuals’ commission of enumerated atrocities.108
Following the Convention's entry into force, absolute prohibition
against torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment has become accepted as a principle of
customary international law; that is, the applicability of these
prohibitions under the Convention has been broadened to include
non-signatory states.109
It might be fair to state that the incorporation of the UDHR
principles in later international law instruments has not been
uniform. The fact that some of its principles have become elevated
to the status of customary international law, however, bodes well for
greater incorporation of international human rights laws in
international legal instruments in the future. Specifically, the
expansion of international human rights laws with respect to the
concept of responsibility under international law opens up the
possibility that, over time, individual perpetrators of heinous crimes,
such as those committed with use of nuclear weapons, can be held
responsible under revised, evolved, or expanded international laws
of nuclear proliferation.
International humanitarian rights laws also offer such a
prospect.
Traditionally, international humanitarian rights
instruments, such as the Geneva Conventions,110 also place
108

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 103, art. IV (“1. Each State Party shall
ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall
apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which
constitutes complicity or participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make
these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their
grave nature.”).
109
See id. pmbl. (“Desiring to make more effective the struggle against
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout
the world . . . .”
110
See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I),
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention
III), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva
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responsibility on states to criminalize inhuman and atrocious
behavior. For instance, article 146 of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
requires that States Parties "enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention.” As the title of the Convention indicates, the sanctions
are to be applied only during times of war, i.e., when there is an
international adversarial engagement of armed forces. Yet, in the
Tadić case, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) noted that, as early as
the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39, international law
has been increasingly becoming involved in non-international
armed conflict, the civil war.111 The greater involvement of
international humanitarian laws in civil wars, as well as international
wars, indicates humanitarian laws’ greater amenability to bringing
both states and individuals within the purview of the law.
Giving an account of evolution in this area of law, the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY pointed out that the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) had recognized in the 1985 Nicaragua case
that certain minimum humanitarian standards must be upheld during
internal armed conflict.112 The standards primarily bind state parties
to international legal instruments incorporating international
humanitarian law, obligating states to legislate, investigate,
prosecute, and punish violations of people’s rights and freedoms
against persons.113 Those requirements have also, arguably, passed
into the customary international law.114
Convention IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950);
111
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 100 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“As early as the Spanish Civil War
(1936-39), State practice revealed a tendency to disregard the distinction between
international and internal wars and to apply certain general principles of
humanitarian law, at least to those internal conflicts that constituted large-scale
civil wars.”).
112
Id. ¶¶ 101–02.
113
Schabas, supra note 94, at 910.
114
Id.
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States’ obligations under international humanitarian law,
however, extend only with respect to certain identified heinous
violations that can be characterized as “international crimes”115 The
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) exercises jurisdiction over
international crimes.116 The ICC hears cases of a category of crimes
that the ICJ considered under the Arrest Warrant case.117 These
enumerated crimes—crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes—do not include terrorism in general or terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction.118 The passage of the
humanitarian laws’ requirements into the customary international
law, however, opens up the possibility of their broader application.

115

Id.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1988, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] ("Recalling that it is the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes”); Schabas, supra note 94, at 910 (pointing out that the concept of
“international crimes” has not been expatiated upon by the Rome Statute). Rather,
it is a customary international law concept that imposes a duty upon states to
prosecute international crimes committed both within and outside their territory.
Id. In other words, the concept of “international crimes” pre-exists International
Criminal Court in international custom. The ICC merely reminds states of their
jurisdiction of such crimes and of their duty in that regard. Id.
117
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 2002 (Feb. 14).
118
In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
mentioned “crimes against humanity” and “war crimes” rather than “international
crimes.” See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 13, 58, 64. Similarly, the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees recognized two categories of crimes to which the
convention applied: (1) a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity; and (2) “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.” Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(F)(c), July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137; see Schabas, supra note 94, at 911 (arguing that, based on these
specific distinctions, some international crimes, such as drug trafficking, fail to
lend the gravitas that characterize violations of a fundamental human right and
are therefore not covered under the Statute). One could also note that the war
crime triggers international jurisdiction due to the cost it entails in human
suffering, and a crime against humanity, similarly, comprises other acts that are
contrary to United Nation’s purposes and principles, which also seek to alleviate
human suffering and indignity.)
116
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C. Individual Responsibility under International Law in
International and Non-International Armed Conflict
International law has historically been concerned with
international, rather than non-international armed conflict. In the
context of wars, international humanitarian law has been
traditionally concerned primarily with states’ reciprocal
commitments on matters such as treatment of non-combatant
victims.
The distinction between international crimes and noninternational crimes became gradually blurred with time. For
instance, in the 1930s’ Spanish Civil War, the internal nature of the
conflict lessened the role of international law, and, yet, the
jurisdiction of international law were applied in the case of internal
conflict against the insurgent non-state actors.119 The international
humanitarian law following Spanish Civil War developed, like the
international human rights law, to protect individual rights against
states.120 In the same vein, article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the common article to all four Geneva Conventions,
entitled “Conflicts not of an International Character,” recognizes
that certain rules of the laws of war apply to conflicts that are
internal. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions defines a conflict not
of international character as the one between a state’s armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups, not
including riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence.121
119

See Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 100. The Spanish Civil War had
elements of both an internal and an international armed conflict. “Significantly,
both the republican Government and third States refused to recognize the
insurgents as belligerents. They nonetheless insisted that certain rules concerning
international armed conflict applied.” Id.
120
Schabas, supra note 94, at 914–15.
121
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
Protocol II elaborates in article 1(1) on armed conflicts not of international
character as the ones “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations.” The Additional Protocol II excludes from this definition in article
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An act of nuclear terrorism is likely to be characterized as an
armed conflict. If non-state actors threaten to use or use nuclear
arms, the conflict is likely to be characterized as non-international
armed conflict simply because the conflict is not between states,
regardless of whether nuclear terrorism is internal or transnational.
International law of armed conflict has been gradually expanding to
encompass acts that are neither strictly international nor perpetrated
by states.122 An important question for the purposes of this Article
is whether non-state actors committing extreme violence using
nuclear weapons can be punished under international law when their
act relates to a non-international armed conflict.
It is pertinent to note that, in the case of nuclear terrorism, as
in the case of almost any crime, the primary avenue for prosecution
is to be courts of the state in which such terrorism is committed.
Regarding some crimes,
[t]he right to justice entails
obligations for the State: to
investigate violations, to prosecute
the perpetrators and, if their guilt is
established, to punish them . . . . On
principle, it should remain the rule
that national courts have jurisdiction,
because any lasting solution must
come from the nation itself. But all
too often national courts are not yet
capable of handing down impartial
justice or are physically unable to
function.123

1(2) “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts.” See also Schabas, supra note 94, at 914–15.
122
Schabas, supra note 94, at 914.
123
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil
and political), E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, ¶¶ 27–28, (June 26, 1997).
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Schabas points out that an act by a non-state actor defined as an
international crime entails that states prosecute offenses that might
be committed outside their territory, and if a state that obtains
custody of the person is unable to do so, it should hand over the
accused to another state that is more willing and able to do so under
the principle expressed as aut dedere aut judicare, translated as
“extradite or prosecute.”124 It is unclear whether this principle is
part of customary international law.125 The same is the case of the
principle of universal jurisdiction.126 Implicitly, this principle is
coextensive with that of aut dedere aut judicare, but is less used in
treaties.127 For either principle, the status of the principle as a norm
of customary international law is debated only in the context of
offenses that can be defined as international crimes.128
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(“Rome Statute” or “Statute”) offers greater conceptual clarity as to
the expanding reach of international law over perpetrators of crimes
in international and non-international armed conflicts.129
The
124

Schabas, supra note 94, at 912–13.
See Schabas, supra note 94, at 913 (“This obligation is set out in in
article 5(2) of the Convention against Torture and in the ‘grave breaches’
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. However, [it is omitted from] the
Genocide Convention or the Apartheid Convention.”). This makes it unclear
whether a customary norm to prosecute or extradite exists. Id. at 917.
126
INT’L
JUSTICE
RES.
CTR.,
Universal
Jurisdiction,
http://www.ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-ofuniversal-jurisdiction/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2018) (stating that under universal
jurisdiction, a national court can exercise its jurisdiction to prosecute individuals
for serious crimes, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and
torture, on the grounds that such crimes are committed against the international
community or international order). National courts generally invoke universal
jurisdiction in the absence of other, traditional bases of criminal jurisdiction, such
as nationality of the state whose court is seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction,
when the crime was not committed within the territory of the state, or when
national interests are not harmed. Id.
127
Schabas, supra note 94, at 913 (pointing out that this concept was
purposefully omitted from some treaties, such as Genocide Convention, because
states wished to avoid giving other states pretext for intervention in domestic
matters, particularly for political reasons).
128
Id.
129
Rome Statute, supra note 116; see also Schabas, supra note 94, at
914–15.
125
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Statute defines armed conflict not of international character in a
manner similar to the Geneva Convention. Article 8 of the Rome
Statute, entitled “War Crimes” confers jurisdiction to ICC on both
international armed conflict—article 8(2)(b)—and armed conflicts
not of international character—article (8)(2)(c). The latter is defined
as a “serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions.” Article 8(2)(d) excludes from International Criminal
Court’s jurisdiction over armed conflicts not of an international
character “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar
nature.” Article 8(2)(b) lists in general terms violations that fall
within ICC’s jurisdiction over armed conflicts not of an
international character. More pertinent, for the purpose of this
Article, however, are the “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international
character” listed under article 8(2)(e). Article 8(2)(e)(i) gives ICC
jurisdiction over acts of “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the
civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities.” Article 8(2)(e) is not applicable to “riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar
nature”; under article 8(2)(f) it applies “when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups.” That is, the armed conflict
has to rise above loosely joined bandits and rioting groups of nonstate actors to non-state actor groups with certain organizational
capacity before the conflicts fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
While legal specifics regarding culpability of non-state
actors might differ under the Geneva Convention and the Rome
Statute, in principle the two international law instruments recognize
culpability under international law of organized groups of non-state
actors violating norms of international conflict in the context of noninternational conflict, indicating consonance on this matter between
international humanitarian laws and international criminal laws.
Beyond recognition of culpability of non-state actors under
international law, the next question arises whether non-state actors
can be punished in international courts for international crimes
committed during armed conflict not of international character.
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D. Punishment of Non-State Actors under International Law
That individuals can be held responsible, i.e., punished, for
certain violations of international law was central to the Nuremburg
Principles.130 In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly
affirmed “the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nurnberg [Nuremburg] Tribunal and the judgment of
the Tribunal.”131 The concept, however, was limited then to the
context of war.132
The Geneva Conventions too recognized individual
responsibility in the same sense under the principle of prosecute or
extradite for serious crimes through a “grave breach” doctrine.133
They considered, however, only those crimes that were committed
in the context of international armed conflicts, and, although noninternational violations could be criminal under the common article
3, those violations did not constitute international crimes and could
not, therefore, be punished under international law.134
In 1995, however, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY ruled,
in Prosecutor v. Tadić, contrary to the previously accepted opinion
of legal and judicial scholars, on the question of jurisdiction of the
international tribunal over individuals.135 The Appeals Chamber
wrote that the nature of certain offenses are such that “do not affect
the interests of one State alone but shock the conscience of

130

See Formulation of the Principles of International Law Recognized
in the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal
[1956] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 28–58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950.
131
G.A. Res. 95 (I), supra note 96.
132
Schabas, supra note 94, at 917.
133
Grave breaches specified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in
additional
Protocol
I
of
1977,
ICRC,
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/57jp2a.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2019) (including the following offenses: willful killing, torture or
inhumane treatment, willfully causing great suffering, causing serious injury to
body or health, and extensive destruction of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly).
134
Schabas, supra note 94, at 917.
135
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Defense Brief to
Support the Notice of (Interlocutory) Appeal (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Aug. 25, 1995).
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mankind.”136 More significantly, and pertinent for the purposes of
this Article, the Appeals Chamber also wrote that “[i]t is by now a
settled rule of customary international law that crimes against
humanity do not require a connection to international armed conflict
. . . [C]ustomary international law may not require a connection
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all.” That is, a
“crime against humanity” can arise when there is a conflict and
when there is no conflict, internal or international. Therefore,
dismissing the challenge to its jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that it had “jurisdiction over crimes committed in either
internal or international armed conflicts.”137 In other words, the
Appeals Chamber assumed jurisdiction over cases where extreme
atrocities were committed in conflicts related to armed domestic
and/or international conflict.
The U.N. support for prosecution of serious international
crimes committed during either internal or international armed
conflicts was emphasized in the case of non-international armed
struggle in Sierra Leone. The Peace Agreement created amnesty for
the warring persons of the Revolutionary Front of Sierra Leone.138
However, the United Nations Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Sierra Leone stated that the amnesty provision
did not apply to “international crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international

136

Id. ¶ 57. Citing an earlier case, the Appeals Chamber wrote: “Crimes
against the laws and customs of war cannot be considered political offences, as
they do not harm a political interest of a particular State, nor a political right of a
particular citizen. They are, instead, crimes of lèse-humanité (reati di lesa
umanità) and, as previously demonstrated, the norms prohibiting them have a
universal character, not simply a territorial one. Such crimes, therefore, due to
their very subject matter and particular nature are precisely of a different and
opposite kind from political offences. The latter generally, concern only the States
against whom they are committed; the former concern all civilised States, and are
to be opposed and punished, in the same way as the crimes of piracy, trade of
women and minors, and enslavement are to be opposed and punished, wherever
they may have been committed.” Id.
137
Id. ¶ 142.
138
S.C. Res. 777 (July 7, 1999).
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humanitarian law.”139 Meisenberg140 found the decision to be
unconvincing and controversial due to the fact that the Appeals
Chamber invoked universal jurisdiction (i.e., its own rightful
jurisdiction over the case) before addressing Sierra Leone’s duty
under international law to investigate and prosecute.141 Meisenberg,
however, acknowledged that the decision was an important step in
the development of international humanitarian law’s expanse over
non-state actors who commit serious crimes in a non-international
armed conflict.142 Evaluating the shift in international law regarding
international law’s jurisdictional reach over non-state actors,
Schabas wrote,
It is now beyond any doubt that war
crimes and crimes against humanity
are punishable as crimes of
international law when committed in
non-international armed conflict.
Non-State actors, who may be
members of guerrilla movements,
armed bands, and even provisional
governments,
are
subject
to
139

U. N. Secretary-General, Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, ¶ 7, UN Doc. S/1999/836 (July 30,
1999).
140
Simon M. Meisenberg, Legality of Amnesties in International
Humanitarian Law. The Lomé Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, 86 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA CROIX-ROUGE [INT’L REV. RED CROSS]
837, 845 (2004) (Fr.).
141
Meisenberg, supra note 139, at 851 (“The Appeals Chamber did not
address Sierra Leone’s own duty to investigate and prosecute in international law,
but merely based its findings on the principle of universality. Such an approach is
unconvincing, owing to the unusual place of the Special Court in international
law, and incompatible with the country’s legal obligation to transfer arrested
persons to the court, since the court lacks its own enforcement mechanisms. The
court should have specifically established treaty obligations for Sierra Leone to
prosecute with regard to all crimes before it and to non-international armed
conflict in particular, rather than invoke the principle of universal jurisdiction in
order to rule that the amnesties granted are no bar to prosecution before an
international and foreign court.”).
142
Id. at 843.
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prosecution on this basis. Where, for
whatever reason, trials are not
possible or desirable before the courts
of the territory where the crimes have
taken place, justice systems of other
States
may
assume
their
responsibilities and prosecute on the
basis of universal jurisdiction.
Amnesty or some other measure of
impunity applicable in the State
where the crime has taken place, is no
obstacle or bar to trial elsewhere.
These developments in the law—
most of them quite recent—mean that
perpetrators of serious violations of
human
rights
during
noninternational
armed
conflicts,
including non-State actors, are far
less likely to escape justice than they
were in the past.143
It is clear that international law reaches non-state actors.
E. International Law’s Reach over Possible Nuclear Terrorists
Specifically, war crimes and crimes against humanity have
come within the grip of international law. Crimes against humanity,
a matter of interest for this Article in the context of feared nuclear
terrorism, require a finding under the Rome Statute—which created
the International Criminal Court—that acts be “committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack” to qualify as crimes
against humanity.144 International law has come a long way, it
appears; however, the question arises whether it can reach non-state
actors if they commit nuclear terrorism.

143
144

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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Rome Statute, supra note 116, art. 7.
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In the wake of the extremely violent events of September 11,
2001, the United Nations High Commissioner denounced the
terrorist attacks on the United States as “crimes against
humanity.”145 The classification fitted as the attacks were regarded
as being part of a systematic attack against a civilian population with
knowledge of the attack.146
Even when a terroristic act fits the definition of crimes of
humanity, it cannot be prosecuted by the ICC. The Rome Statute
excludes terrorism from ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction. At the
time of delineating ICC’s jurisdiction, the Final Act of the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (“Final Act”)147
expressed regret that although terrorist acts constitute “serious
crimes of concern to international community,” lacking a generally
acceptable definition, terrorism could not be included in jurisdiction
of the proposed ICC.148
In the past, some states—Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, and
Turkey—proposed considering terrorism as a crime against
humanity and subjecting it to ICC’s jurisdiction. Those who
rejected the proposal adduced four reasons: (1) terrorism could not
be precisely defined; (2) inclusion of terrorism to ICC’s jurisdiction
would introduce political divisions in the Court; (3) only some acts
terrorism are serious enough to justify jurisdiction of an
international tribunal; and (4) national courts are more efficient than
international tribunals.149 Obviously, participants in the debate
were not at the time cognizant of the possibility of nuclear terrorism,
145

Terror attacks on US were crimes against humanity, UN rights
official
says,
UN
NEWS
(Sept.
25,
2001),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2001/09/15342-terror-attacks-us-were-crimesagainst-humanity-un-rights-official-says; see also Cassese, supra note 13, at 993–
95.
146
Id.
147
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Final Act of the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I) (June 15–July
17, 1998).
148
Id. annex I, E.
149
Cassese, supra note 13, at 494.
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which, by its very nature, is an extreme act of violence.150
Regardless of lack of this cognizance, excluding all acts of terrorism
from ICC’s jurisdiction because “some” acts of terrorism are not
serious enough appears to be a weak reason. A stronger reason for
the proposal’s rejection seems to be the objection by some
developing countries that feared that peoples’ struggle for freedom
from foreign domination could come to be characterized as
terrorism.151 Also, the problem of definition of acts of terrorism
arises from the concern to identify such distinct acts as serial killing
or killings and other destructive acts in a course of drug trafficking,
which can have the characteristics of being widespread and
systematic.152 The Final Act, however, affirmed that the matter is
not closed: the review mechanism of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court allows for a future expansion of the Court’s
jurisdiction. The Final Act, in fact, recommended that under article
123 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court a
Review Conference should consider arriving at an acceptable
definition of terrorist crimes and including them within the Court’s
jurisdiction.153 By following up on this recommendation, acts of
terrorism may be subsumed within “crimes against humanity,”
whose definition has over time moved away from strict adherence
to crimes that are committed, supported, incited, or tolerated by a
state to those committed by individuals without any state
involvement, as discussed above. The law in this area, however, is
still unsettled, and scope remains for bringing terrorism under
“crimes against humanity,” over which ICC can exercise
jurisdiction.

150

NUKEMAP
BY
ALEX
WELLERSTEIN,
https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2018) (hosting a
simulation that produces dire results with a virtual detonation of terrorist-made
crude nuclear weapon of 10 kilo tons–the size North Korea tested in 2013–
detonated as airburst over Washington, D.C. would create 54,380 fatalities and
86,080 injuries).
151
Cassese, supra note 13, at 994.
152
Schabas, supra note 94.
153
Rome Statute, supra note 116, art. 123 (noting that the Rome Statute
of the ICC provides, under this article, for the review of the Statute seven years
after its entry into force).
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The problem of finding a definition of terrorism that
distinguishes terrorism from an ordinary crime and forms of
nationalist struggles has lingered over a long period of time. Treaty
law has struggled with the issue since 1920s.154 The League of
Nations, the International Law Commission, and the General
Assembly have pondered on the issue.155 The fact that the
international community has made multiple and protracted attempts
does not provide evidence of emergence of a customary law; yet,
treaties carry evidence of generally accepted rules,156 and, therefore,
the attempts delineate outlines and sharpen basic features of what
behaviors international community proscribes or criminalizes. In
other words, the repeated and recurring attempts to pin down a
generic definition of terrorism testifies to the normative importance
that the world community places on the matter.157 Early on, the
international community realized that sound definition will hinge
upon the underlying motive of the act to distinguish it from an
organized transnational crime committed for material benefit or
struggles for a peoples’ self-determination.158
It is conceivable to extract such a definition from the
Protocol 1 of the 1977 Amendment to the Geneva Convention. Saul
suggests that the Amendment enshrines international humanitarian
law, as well as it contains provisions that proscribe behaviors that
can be considered “terrorism,” thus helping us reach a generic
definition of terrorism in a way that can make terrorism punishable
under international humanitarian law that the Geneva Conventions
154

Ben Saul, Attempts to Define Terrorism in International Law,
52 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 57, 58 (2005) (explaining why and giving examples to
prove that terrorism is difficult to define in international law.); see generally id.
155
Id. at 59–66 (listing various attempts by the League of Nations to
arrive at a consensus on the definition of the term “terrorism” during various
international conferences); id. at 66–68 (detailing similar attempts by the
International Law Commission during the drafting of its 1954 Draft Code of
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Part I)); see generally id. at
72–83 (detailing multiple attempts by the UN General Assembly to address the
threat of terrorism by arriving at a definition, particularly in the context of the
establishment of the International Criminal Court).
156
Id. at 58.
157
Id. at 65.
158
Id. at 79–80
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represent.159 Although the Protocol 1 of 1977 primarily relates to
armed conflicts, it bans certain behaviors that, when enacted in
either international or non-international armed conflicts—that is,
when the armed conflict is between states and when the armed
conflict involves non-state actors—can be characterized as
terroristic, rather than purely military combat behaviors. Articles
51, entitled “Protection of the Civilian Population,” for instance,
prohibits attacks on civilian population. Article 51(2), specifically,
prohibits “[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which
is to spread terror among the civilian population” or “indiscriminate
attacks.”
Article 51(4) prohibits “indiscriminate attacks,”
specifying, inter alia, that indiscriminate attacks include “[those]
that are not directed at a specific military objective,” and in general
“are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction.”
Articles 51 and 54 outlaw
indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations and destruction of
food,
water,
and
other
materials
needed
for
survival. Indiscriminate attacks include directly attacking civilian
(non-military) targets, and also attacking civilians by using
technology such as biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and land
mines. It is, thus, possible to extract a definition of terrorism from
the Protocol 1 of the 1977 Amendment to the Geneva Convention.
F. Jus Cogens, or Peremptory Norm of International Law,
against Nuclear Proliferation by Non-State Actors and Nuclear
Terrorism
Article 53 of the VCLT 1969, defines, for the purposes of
the Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law
(“jus cogens”) as “a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”
The Convention, thus, dictates that a norm be
considered to be “peremptory,” and, thus, not be derogated from, if
the international community “as a whole” accepts and recognizes it.
Examples of such norms are the use of force, slavery, genocide, and
159

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/1
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piracy.160 Legal practitioners and scholars have regarded that
definition to be applicable to the international law at large, and not
just for the purposes of the 1969 VCLT.161
In this connection, with regard to constitutionality of acts of
international organizations, Orakhelashvili made an important
observation concerning distinction between jus dispositivum and jus
cogens.162 International organizations can lawfully disregard the
former, the ordinary norms of international law, “provided and to
the extent that the constituent instrument evidences the intention of
member states to enable the organization to act in such manner while
exercising its functions.”163 However, “if a relevant norm is
peremptory [i.e., it is recognized as jus cogens], then states cannot
derogate from it, establishing an organization with the power to act
in disregard of jus cogens. Therefore, jus cogens is an inherent
limitation on any organization’s powers.”164 In other words, when
a peremptory norm of international law emerges, international
organizations are guided by it rather than their constituent
instruments, which are based on states’ consent. That is,
international organizations are to follow peremptory norms even if
a state has not explicitly consented to it. This argument promises
progress for the objective of punishing possible nuclear terrorists by
hinting that acts of extreme violence that conflict with international
law’s jus cogens, or peremptory norms, might be brought within the
jurisdiction of the ICC without explicit assignment of ICC’s
jurisdiction over terrorism and without a legal definition of those
acts as “terrorism.” In the section on individual responsibility
above, the discussion made it clear that the ICC has already assumed
jurisdiction over individuals in both international and noninternational armed conflict where the acts fall under specified
160

M. FITZMAURICE & A. QUAST, LAW OF TREATITES: SECTION A:
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 17 (2007).
161
Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened
Pandora's Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L.
853, 854–55 (2007).
162
Orakhelashvili, supra note 72, at 60.
163
Id.
164
Id.
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categories. While a case can be made by defining terrorism
accompanied by extreme violence, such as nuclear terrorism, as a
crime against humanity to bring the acts within the jurisdiction of
ICC, another avenue of potential success in the objective of
punishing nuclear terrorists would be to actively promote
prohibition of such acts, punishing them up on the hierarchy of
norms to rise to the level of just cogens, as discussed below.
de Wet points out that in the international legal system a
hierarchy of norms has emerged, such that the peremptory norms, or
jus cogens, are primarily related to human rights norms.165 In fact,
the VCLT made it illegal for states to conclude mutual treaties that
violate a peremptory law.166 Currently, the few norms that have
become jus cogens recognize prohibition of genocide, torture,
slavery, and similar other crimes.167 In those crimes, individuals or
states, the perpetrators of actions, become subject to universal
jurisdiction.168
Interestingly, de Wet observed that certain crimes rose to the
status of jus cogens because the normative framework of the U.N.
Charter system positively elevated certain values above others,
through codification, such as by creating provisions that condemn

165

Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 51, 57 (2006).
166
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 54, art. 2, ¶ 1
(“For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character.”).
167
de Wet, supra note 165, at 59.
168
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio
Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63 (1996) (“International crimes that
rise to the level of jus cogens constitute obligatio erga omnes which are
inderogable. Legal obligations which arise from the higher status of such crimes
include the duty to prosecute or extradite, the non-applicability of statutes of
limitations for such crimes, the non-applicability of any immunities up to and
including Heads of State, the non-applicability of the defense of ‘obedience to
superior orders’ (save as mitigation of sentence), the universal application of these
obligations whether in time of peace or war, their non-derogation under ‘states of
emergency,’ and universal jurisdiction over perpetrators of such crimes.”).
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violations of human rights.169 At the time of gross violations of
human rights, such as crimes against humanity that the Nazi
Germany committed or genocides in Rawanda and Bosnia, such
condemnation accelerated concretization of prohibitions of acts
constituting those crimes—committed by either states or persons—
as jus cogens, making the acts punishable under universal
jurisdiction over criminals. Today, international law must add to jus
cogens acts of extreme violence that might result from use of nuclear
weapons by states or individuals. In fact, deliberation on the
underlying legal principle that nudged crimes of genocide, torture,
and slavery up to the level of jus cogens might reveal that nuclear
terrorism and its threat have a close kinship with these crimes by
virtue of similar human rights violations inherent in them and
humanitarian concerns that they raise. Nuclear terrorism must also
be helped rise to the level of jus cogens in the same way.
Currently, terrorist attacks are considered serious crimes to
be prosecuted in national courts under domestic laws of the
prosecuting state.170 Cassese argues that terrorism, when it is
transnational, state-sponsored, or state-condoned, is an international
crime and is prohibited by the customary international law.171 This
Article argues that nuclear terrorism, which is an extreme form of
terrorism—even when it is not transnational, state-sponsored, or
state-condoned—falls under the distinct category of noninternational armed conflict. It must be brought under the
jurisdiction of the ICC through application of international
humanitarian laws and by broadening the category of “crimes
against humanity.” Doing so comports with the general principles
of international law concerning fairness and justice, as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations.
G. Recommendations for Shift in Law in View of Growing Threat
of Nuclear Terrorism from Individuals and Groups
As noted above, ICC’s Final Act did not regard the matters
to have been finalized beyond possibility of change. It foresaw
169

de Wet, supra note 165, at 58.
Cassese, supra note 13, at 993.
171
Id. at 994.
170
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expansion of International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction in the
future—which is now. It recommended that a future Review
Conference would forge a definition of terrorist crimes, acceptable
to the world community, to include heinous acts of terrorism within
the Court’s jurisdiction. As pointed out above, a successful follow
up on this recommendation will subsume egregious acts of terrorism
within “crimes against humanity.” Also, as noted above, this
category of crimes, covered by the ICC’s jurisdiction, already
includes crimes committed by individuals without any state
involvement, making this recommended shift in international law to
be just another small forward step, but one with far-reaching impacts
to international peace and security.
Following that step, both individual terrorists and groups can
be prosecuted by the ICC. The ICC prosecution of terrorist groups
can proceed along the path taken by Justice Jackson, the Chief
United States Prosecutor of the principal Axis war criminals at the
Nuremberg Trials at the International Military Tribunal following
World War II. In his report of June 6, 1945, Justice Jackson laid out
his plan for prosecuting both organizations and individuals, and that
plan can be adapted for holding modern terrorist organization
accountable for nuclear terrorism. Justice Jackson wrote:
In
examining
the
accused
organizations in the trial, it is our
proposal to demonstrate their
declared and covert objectives,
methods of recruitment, structure,
lines of responsibility, and methods
of effectuating their programs. In this
trial,
important
representative
members will be allowed to defend
their organizations as well as
themselves. . . . If in the main trial an
organization is found to be criminal,
the second stage will be to identify
and try before regular military
tribunals individual members not
already personally convicted in the
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principal case. Findings in the main
trial that an organization is criminal in
nature will be conclusive in any
subsequent proceedings against
individual members. The individual
member will thereafter be allowed to
plead only personal defenses or
extenuating circumstances, such as
that he joined under duress, and as to
those defenses he should have the
burden of proof.172
By adapting this formula in the context of possible nuclear
terrorism—first finding organizations culpable and then holding
individuals working for that organization responsible—the ICC
would be able to prosecute both groups and individuals. It might be
important to note also that the Justice Jackson prosecution plan was
limited only to barbarities committed by organizations and
individuals who had committed them as members of organizations.
Individuals who had committed barbarities without being part of an
organization and in their personal capacities were not part of this
plan. He wrote, “Our case against the major defendants is concerned
with the Nazi master plan, not with individual barbarities and
perversions which occurred independently of any central plan.”173
In the case of nuclear terrorism, the logistical, technical, and
financial difficulties, as well as the complexities of large-scale
ideological perversions that might prompt someone to undertake
destruction and massacre in such grand scale, might preclude lonewolf nuclear terrorism. Thus, adapting broad outlines of the Justice
Jackson prosecution plan to nuclear terrorism can be feasible with
minimal modifications.
Another recommendation that this Article makes for
addressing possible nuclear terrorism is to elevate purposefully
prohibition against such an act to the level of jus cogens. At this
172

Letter from Robert H. Jackson to President Harry Truman para. 3
(June 6, 1945) (on file with Yale Law School Library).
173
Id. para. 4.
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time, the world community is acutely perceiving this threat, as
discussed above, and the world opinion is consolidating on the
seriousness of damage that can result if the threat realizes. Already,
a number of international conventions, treaties, and other
multilateral arrangements are in place to deal with the possibility of
such a situation. Already, urgency is being felt to prevent nuclear
terrorism. Time is opportune to give this emerging norm against
possession and use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors and
groups a nudge to raise it to the level of a peremptory norm of
international law, from which no derogation is possible.
IV. CONCLUSION
International law receives its impetus for and direction of
evolution from its dual character, as identified by Ku and Diehl: as
an operating system, it establishes rules and norms that chart out
outlines of potential interactions; as a normative system, it identifies
“substantive values and goals” that international actors are to pursue
in international relations.174 Ku and Diehl’s conception of
international law as an operating system175 is handy for the purposes
of the suggestions advanced in the last part of this Article, noted
above.
Ku and Diehl regard the international legal system as
capable of dealing with multiple issues and one that is not only
engendered of the values and norms that it promotes but also shapes
its counterpart: international law as a normative system.176 Seen in
its entirety, as a totality of operating principles and values,
international law, thus, enshrines an internal dynamic that prods it
on the path of development so that norms developed in one part of
international law make themselves available for operational
purposes in other parts of the law. This Article has proposed that
the values embodied in international humanitarian laws must inform
laws that are meant to protect the world from proliferation and use
of nuclear weapons by the emerging new non-state individual and
group actors, national or transnational in scope, meaning to harm
174

Ku & Diehl, supra note 12, at 4.
Id.
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human security through nuclear terrorism. This direction of
evolution is not too far-fetched to foresee: international law in other
areas, such as human rights laws and humanitarian laws, has already
brought individuals within its fold.177
More pertinent for the purposes of this Article is Ku and
Diehl’s comment that, in the traditional way, international law
undergoes normative shift as customary practices evolve.178 A
normative shift can, however, also be purposefully and actively
brought about. Recently, new treaties, including the NPT, have been
used to bring about normative shift when such a need arose.179 The
treaty on nuclear non-proliferation was concluded when the power
of the atom was discovered and its enormous potential for both
peaceful and destructive purposes was understood and need was felt
to both promote its peaceful purposes and restrict its use for
destructive purposes. Today, the NPT needs a second normative
shift. The NPT, as concluded, did not foresee the emergence of
catastrophic terrorism in a new world order where the danger of
proliferation and use of nuclear weapons will arise from non-state
groups and individuals seeking to end the world or inflict extreme
violence on adversaries.180 The NPT can be revised to incorporate
the new reality. It can be revised by incorporating principles
emerging from other areas of laws or by helping advance the idea of
nuclear non-proliferation to the level of jus cogens such that the state
consent requirement of international law is not a bar against
prosecution of nuclear terrorists.
At the risk of belaboring the point, it may be pertinent to
apply ideas from Franck’s classic book Fairness in International
Law and Institutions to the subject matter of this Article. Franck
noted early in the book that in international law’s post-ontological
stage in the late twentieth century, when the number and functions
of international organizations hiked, the proper inquiry is not
177
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whether international law is law but whether it is fair and
effective.181 Fairness in laws for Franck is composed of legitimacy
and distributive justice, the former being a function of mechanisms
that guarantee fair procedures and the latter being a function of the
value and worth of laws in allocating appropriate burdens and
benefits. Legitimacy in rules seeks to preserve order, and
distributive justice in rules favors change. Through the tension
between order and change, societies seek fairness.182 Legal systems
are judged by their consequences, in which both procedure and
substance matter. Franck’s fairness thesis develops further as he
points out that the tension between legitimacy and justice—or order
and change—is impacted by the concept of equity in international
law.183 When equity is employed to create an exception to the rule
when a strict application of the rule might result in unfairness or
injustice, a certain level of rule indeterminacy results, or rule
legitimacy is lowered. On the one hand, a certain level of rule
indeterminacy is to be expected in all bodies of law as it helps arrive
at agreements and achieve flexibility.184 On the other hand, rule
indeterminacy can help justify non-compliance.185 A determinate or
inflexible rule can also lose legitimacy if its application brings about
an unjust result.186 Calling such rules as “idiot rules”—as opposed
to “sophist rules,” highly flexible rules—Franck writes:
[Highly determinate or inflexible
rules] sometimes tend to be
unsophisticated in their lack of finetuning and are then likely to be
perceived—at their margins—as
181

FRANCK, supra note 81, at 6.
Id. at 22–24.
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Id. at 31.
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Id.
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Giving several examples from modern international relations, Franck
wrote: “In such cases ‘hard and fast’ rules of apportionment can be applied at the
risk of achieving results which lead to moral outrage and law’s reductio ad
absurdum. In that sense, fairness discourse which aims to temper the imperative
of legitimacy with that of justice serves not to undermine but to redeem the law.”
Id. at 79.
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unreasonable and illegitimate in their
demands. If a patently absurd or unfair
result accrues from the only possible
application of the evident meaning of
a simple rule in circumstances
requiring a more calibrated response,
then that rule has suffered reductio ad
absurdum, a condition which even
may undermine its legitimacy in
circumstances not at its margins.187
In Franck’s terms, international laws’ inability to punish non-state
actors even if they commit nuclear terrorism and devastate life arises
out of excessive high level of determinacy, or inflexibility, of the
rules. Pertinent to this Article are the laws that hold perpetrators of
certain acts, falling under the category of “crimes against
humanity,” culpable under international law and punishable under
the ICC jurisdiction, but are rendered impotent against nuclear
terrorists. The patent unfairness of the outcome, or ineffectiveness
of the application, of these rules to respond to a new, worrisome
situation of the emerging threat of nuclear terrorism, can be
mitigated by application of equity in one of the forms defined and
explained by Franck. In this situation, equity must take the form of
extending ICC’s jurisdiction of nuclear terrorism, not merely by
characterizing nuclear terrorism as a crime against humanity but by
acting, even when such characterization or definition is hard to
formulate, under the general international law principles that
underlie the prohibition of such acts. Article 1(1) of the U.N.
Charter is a conspicuously-relevant international legal provision
under whose legal authority international institutions’ jurisdiction
can be established over possible nuclear terrorists.188 Further, the
187
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U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1 (“To maintain international peace and security,
and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or

57

IQBAL ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

58

PACE INT’L L. REV.

2/27/19 8:23 PM

[Vol. 31:1

U.N. Charter’s emphasis on international peace and security, whose
breach triggers the U.N. Security Council into action under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, should be brought to bear upon acts or
threats of nuclear terrorism. Even further, normative aspect of the
concept of nuclear non-proliferation must be explicitly embedded in
a large number of key international instruments and multilateral
treaties in the hope of advancing the concept the level of jus cogens
from which derogation might not become possible.
The current international legal regime of nuclear nonproliferation does not apply to non-state actors. The fear has risen
that they may acquire and use nuclear weapons to perpetrate nuclear
terrorism. The direction of change that this Article suggests will
strengthen international law’s reach over possible nuclear terrorists.
Placing the crime under the ICC jurisdiction and/or prompting the
emergence of peremptory norms against nuclear proliferation and
incorporating them in the existing regime of nuclear
nonproliferation with strengthen the international system against
nuclear proliferation and use by terrorists.

settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace.”).
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